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Pledging Requirements 
and Bank Asset Portfolios 
By  Ronald A. Ratti 
Under  state  and  Federal  law,  commercial 
banks  are  required  to  hold  government 
securities  as  a  reserve  against  government 
deposits.  While  these  pledging  requirements 
are  potentially  important  links  between  the 
asset  and liability  sides  of  a  bank's  portfolio, 
they  have  largely  been  ignored  in  the profes- 
sional literature. This omission cannot be justi- 
fied  even  if  pledging  requirements  have  no 
effect  on  bank  demand  for  Government 
securities,  because  locking  up  Government 
securities as  a  pledge  against  public  deposits 
forecloses their use as a source of bank liquidity 
and  reduces flexibility  in  the  management  of 
bank  assets.  Moreover,  if  pledging  require- 
ments do have an impact on bank holdings  of 
Government securities, fluctuations in the 
growth  of  government  deposits  will  have 
important implications on the ability  of  banks 
to meet  credit  demands  and  on  bank  profit- 
ability. ' 
The purpose of  this article is  to examine the 
role of  pledging requirements and to determine 
their impact on the asset portfolio of banks and 
on  bank profitability. The first  section  of  the 
article  reviews  the  pledging  requirements  on 
both  Federal  and  state and  local  government 
deposits,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the 
requirements of  the seven states in  the Tenth 
District. In the second  section,  the arguments 
-both  favorable  and  critical--concerning  the 
role  of  pledging  requirements  are  presented, 
and  possible  alternative  procedures  are 
discussed.  The  third  section  summarizes  the 
empirical  evidence  on  the  effectiveness  and 
likely consequences of  pledging with  regard  to 
bank profitability and asset composition. 
STATUTORY PLEDGING 
REQUIREMENTS 
Federal Government Deposits 
Under  Federal  law,  Federal  Government 
deposits  in  excess  of  those  insured  by  the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  (FDIC) 
must  be  backed  by  eligible  collateral  at  least 
1 As of  November 2, 1978, Treasury tax and loan account 
depositories  may administer their accounts  under either  a 
note option or a  remittance option.  Both  options  require 
the pledge of  acceptable collateral. The Treasury projects 
Ronald  A.  Ratti, associate  professor  of  economics  at the  that there will be an average of around $8 to $8.5 billion in 
University  of  Missouri-Columbia,  was  formerly  a  visiting  TT&L balances  at  depositories,  compared  with  average 
scholar at the Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Kansas City.  The  balances  of  about  $1.5  billion  in  recent  years.  This 
views  expressed  are  the  author's  and  do not  necessarily  anticipated  sharp upward  swing  in  government  funds  at 
reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or  depositories  can  be expected to have  an  impact  on  bank 
the Federal Reserve System.  asset portfolios. 
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consists of obligations issued or insured by the 
U.S.  Government  or  agencies  at  face  value, 
obligations of the states at 90  per cent of  face 
value,  and  obligations  of  other  political 
subdivisions that are not  in default  at 80  per 
cent of face value.'  All assets accepted as satis- 
factory collateral for Federal Government 
deposits are required  to be  physically located 
with a Federal Reserve Bank or its branches or 
with  a  custodian  prescribed  by  the  Federal 
Reserve. 
State and Local Government Deposits 
Thirty-eight  states  have  similar  pledging 
requirements for the deposits of state and local 
 government^.^ These laws and regulations 
differ widely  regarding the  proportion  of 
government  deposits that must  be covered  by 
eligible  collateral,  what  constitutes  eligible 
collateral, how that collateral is valued, and its 
appropriate  physical  condition.  For  example, 
2 The provisions are included in the National Bank Act of 
1919,  the  Second  Liberty  Bank  Act  of  1917,  and  U.S. 
Treasury Circulars Nos. 92, 176, and 848. 
3 Other eligible collateral, as set out in  Treasury  Circular 
No. 92, would be 1) the obligations issued or guaranteed by 
the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development, the Interamerican Development Bank, or the 
Asian Development Bank at face value; 2) loans to students 
which are insured by Federal insurance, a state agency, or 
nonprofit  institutions  or  organizations,  at face  value;  3) 
obligations of domestic corporations, at 80 per cent of face 
value;  or  4)  commercial  and  agricultural  paper  and 
bankers'  acceptances  having  a  maturity  of  less  than one 
year, at 90 per cent of face value. As of October 16, 1978, 
the  acceptable  maturity  on  this  last  category  has  been 
extended to two years. However, the items have also  been 
restricted  to obligations of  domestic corporations.  In  the 
future, the obligations of individuals  and partnerships and 
of foreign borrowers will not be acceptable. 
The states without  laws requiring the pledging  of  assets 
for government deposits or where pledging is not practiced 
are  Arkansas,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Indiana,  Iowa, 
Maine.  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Rhode  Island, 
Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
about  half  of  these  states  have  a  uniform 
pledging  requirement  for state and local 
deposits that ranges from 5 per cent in  South 
Dakota  and  New  Jersey  to  110  per  cent  in 
California,  Minnesota,  Mississippi,  and 
Oklah~ma.~  Five  states  have  no  pledging 
requirements  on  county  or  municipal  deposits 
but require a pledge against state  deposit^;^ two 
states  have  no  requirements  on  municipal 
deposits but do have them on state and county 
deposits;'  and one state, North Dakota, has no 
pledging  requirements  on  state  deposits  but 
does  have  them  on  county  and  municipal 
deposits.  The  remaining  states  that  allow 
pledging  have  differential  nonzero  require- 
ments  on  state,  county,  and  municipal 
deposits. In these states the maximum pledging 
requirement  is  120  per  cent  on  state deposits 
and  110  per  cent  on  county  and  municipal 
 deposit^.^ 
As to eligible collateral, direct obligations of 
the U.S.  Government satisfy  pledging  require- 
ments in all states.  Obligations  guaranteed by 
the  United  States  and  those  of  U.S. 
Government  agencies  are  accepted  by  most 
states.  Also  widely  accepted  are state  bonds, 
notes and  certificates of  indebtedness,  county 
and municipal securities, and revenue bonds. It 
is  very common,  though, for states  to restrict 
eligibility to obligations issued within their own 
jurisdiction. The method of valuation of eligible 
collateral for pledging purposes is either at par 
or at market value  (usually  not to exceed  par 
value).  In some jurisdictions  it is  at par value 
The other  states  with  a  uniform  pledge  for state  and 
local  deposits  are Arizona,  Colorado,  Kansas,  Louisiana, 
New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Oklahoma,  Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
6 These are Georgia, Michigan, South Carolina,  Vermont, 
and West Virginia. 
Hawaii and West Virginia. 
8 The above summary on state pledging  ratios was  drawn 
from Appendix C, "Pledging Assets for Public Deposits," 
American  Bankers Association,  Washington, D.C. (1976). 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City for  some  eligible  items  and  market value  for 
other eligible items. The market value criteria 
tend to be the most frequently applied. 
Most  state  statutes  require  the  physical 
transfer of pledged  assets to a custodian. The 
designated custodian is usually either a Federal 
Reserve  Bank  or  branch  or  a  large 
correspondent bank. For member banks of the 
Federal  Reserve  System  the custodian  is  the 
relevant  regional  Federal  Reserve  Bank  or 
branch.  Typically,  prior  approval  of  the 
custodian is  required before additions or 
subtractions  may  be  made  in  the  pledged 
collateral. 
Requirements in Tenth District States 
The great variation in pledging requirements 
among states is illustrated  by  the requirements 
of states in the Tenth District, as summarized 
in  Table 1.  Six  of  the states have  a  uniform 
pledging  ratio for  various  categories  of  local 
government deposits, varying from 50  per cent 
in New  Mexico, through 70 per cent in Kansas 
and 100 per cent  in  Colorado,  Missouri,  and 
Wyoming,  to 110  per  cent  in  Oklahoma.  In 
Kansas,  however,  if  a  bank  is  successful  in 
obtaining  government  funds and  its  bid  is  in 
excess  of  the rate on  3-month  U.S.  Treasury 
bills,  the requirement  becomes 100  per  cent. 
Also, a resource  pooling option  is  available to 
banks in Colorado that would lower their ratio 
to 50 per cent. In ~ebraska,  the ratio is 110 per 
cent on state funds and 100 per cent on county 
and  municipal funds. All  these  pledging  ratio 
requirements  refer  to  government  funds  in 
excess of those insured by the FDIC. 
+ 
Table 1 
PLEDGING REGULATIONS OF TENTH DISTRICT STATES 
Pledging Ratios on  Deposits  Eligible Collateral  Valuation 
State  -  County  Municipal  Includes*  Method 
(In  per cent) 
Colorado  100t '  100t  1007  First Mortgages  Market 
Kansas  70*  70  *  70%  First Mortgages  Par 
Missouri  100"  100  100  Other State Bonds  Market# 
Nebraska  110  100  100  Other State Bonds 11  Market*" 
New Mexico  50  50  50  ~ixedtt 
Oklahoma  110  110  110  Par 
Wyoming  100  100  100  Market 
*A blank indicates eligible security in that state is limited to  obligations issued or  guaranteed by  the United States or its 
agencies, its own state bonds, and its own state subdivision obligations. An  entry indicates the acceptability of the entry 
in addition to  the preceding. 
tA  resource pooling option is available to the banks ~n Colorado that would lower the ratio to  50  per cent. To  date it 
has not been utilized. 
*If the bank obtaining public funds placed a bid  in  excess of  the current 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, the ratio rises 
to  100  per cent. 
§The  ratlo on  state funds in  Missouri had  been 110  per cent until 1975. 
I1  Restricted to those states whose bonds are purchased by the Board of Education Lands and Funds. This means virtu- 
ally all states. 
#Statutes silent. Market valuation method widely used. 
**The  statutes  on state and county funds are  silent  regarding the valuation method, and market value criteria have 
come to be used.  The statute regarding municipal deposits explicitly states face value to be the appropriate valuation 
method, but  apparently market value is used. 
ttPar  value for obligations of  state of  New Mexico and its subdivisions, market value for other obligations. 
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eligible  collateral  the  obligations  issued  or 
guaranteed by the United States or its agencies, 
their  own  state  bonds,  and  their  own  state 
subdivision obligations. Missouri and Nebraska 
are the only states that find the bonds of  other 
states  acceptable,  and  Colorado  and  Kansas 
allow  first  mortgages  as  eligible  collateral. 
Eligible  collateral  is  valued  on  the  basis  of 
market value in  Colorado and Wyoming,  and 
face  value in  Kansas and  Oklahoma.  In New 
Mexico,  the  obligations  of  the  state  and  its 
subdivisions are valued at face value, and other 
acceptable  obligations  are  valued  at  market 
value. In Missouri and  Nebraska,  the statutes 
are  silent  regarding  the  method  of  valuing 
securities, and market value criteria have been 
adopted.  Acceptable  custodians  for  pledged 
securities  are  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas  City,  its  branches,  or  a  large 
correspondent bank.  Also,  subject to the 
approval  of  the  state  banking  commissioner, 
banks in  Nebraska,  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma, 
and  Wyoming  that  are  not  members  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  may  retain  on  their 
own  premises  the  securities  pledged  against 
state and local government deposits. 
THE ROLE OF PLEDGING 
REQUIREMENTS 
The  basic  reason  for  the  imposition  of 
pledging requirements is to ensure the safety of 
government  deposits  in  banks.9  That  is,  a 
political  entity  whose  deposits  are  backed 
entirely by securities is guaranteed no loss if the 
bank holding its deposits should fail.  Pledging 
requirements  thus  serve  to  ensure  that  the 
political community with funds deposited  in  a 
failed  bank  will  not  endure  any  particular 
financial  hardship.  However,  some  observers 
have argued  that  the  banking  system  is  now 
much  more  regulated  and  stable than  it  was 
during  the  time  pledging  requirements  were 
introduced, so  that  the  argument  concerning 
the  safety  of  government  deposits  is  not  as 
valid. Moreover, some believe that the safety of 
these deposits can be guaranteed by alternative 
means  within  the  existing  regulatory  frame- 
work. 
A second argument used to support the use 
of  pledging  requirements  is  that  they 
strengthen  the  market  for  Government 
securities.  Most  states rule ineligible for 
pledging  purposes  the  obligations  issued  by 
other states or political subdivisions not in their 
jurisdiction.  This  has  the  effect  of  improving 
the market for their own  debt and for  that of 
their  political  subdivisions.  If  the  argument 
concerning the strengthening of the market for 
Government  securities  is  valid,  however,  the 
demand  on  the  part of  banks  for  other  asset 
items, primarily loans, is reduced. This implies 
that  bank  credit  becomes  available  on  less 
favorable  terms  following  imposition  of  the 
requirements.  Thus,  funding  of  government 
projects  at  lower  costs  has  to  be  weighed 
against  the  increased  cost  of  obtaining credit 
for private borrowers at commercial banks. 
A  third  argument  suggested  in  favor  of 
pledging requirements is that they cause banks 
to hold more Government securities than would 
otherwise  be  the  case,  thereby  making  bank 
portfolios  safer.  However,  if  the existence  of 
pledging requirements causes a bank to hold a 
larger quantity of  Government securities,  it is 
by  no means obvious that the bank has a  less 
9 The  National  Bank  Act  of  1864  contained  a  provision 
requiring that U.S. deposits in  national  banks be secured 
by  a pledge of  U.S. bonds or other securities. Prior to this 
act,  Congress  had  required  (since  1779)  that the  United 
States be first satisfied  in the event of  the insolvency  of  a 
debtor,  including  banks.  In  1930,  pledging  by  national 
banks  was  authorized  for  state  and  local  government 
deposits,  and  shortly  thereafter  most  states  passed  laws 
allowing state banks to pledge assets not only against state 
and local government deposits but also against  deposits of 
the United States.  Before  this  time,  government  deposits 
were secured by alternative means such as surety bonds. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City risky  portfolio  than  before.I0  Indeed,  to the 
extent that holdings of  nonpledged  short-term 
securities are reduced,  bank  liquidity  may  be 
reduced as a result of the requirement." 
Another  potential  problem  with  pledging 
requirements  is  that  they  may  lead  to 
suboptimal portfolio  behavior.  That is,  if  the 
management of  government deposits is subject 
to more  restrictions  than  that of  nongovern- 
ment deposits,  the former can be expected  to 
be less profitable. Hence, banks may not hold a 
portfolio of  assets that would  maximize  either 
long-run  profits  or  the  well-being  of  their 
shareholders. This potential problem is compli- 
cated  by  an additional factor:  since state laws 
on pledging differ widely regarding the fraction 
of  government  deposits  that  needs  to  be 
secured,  there  is  a  differential  incidence  of 
pledging requirements between states and dif- 
ferential regulatory  burdens on  banks  in 
different states. 
Possible Alternatives 
Alternative proposals are usually designed  to 
meet some of  the problems referred to above. 
To be considered  practical,  however,  the 
proposals  must  also  ensure  the  security  of 
government  funds.  One  proposal  that  meets 
this  requirement to some  extent  would  grant 
preferred  but unsecured  status to government 
deposits.I2 The experience of the FDIC suggests 
that  government  funds  would  invariably  be 
recoverable  under this  option,  although  only 
after a delay. A second proposal that would not 
involve  such  delays  would  be  a  state 
government  insurance  system."  Under  this 
proposal, the insurance rates paid by commer- 
cial banks could  be determined  by  the level of 
government  funds on deposit and  the charac- 
teristics of the depository institution. Insurance 
coverage  up to some specified  limit  could  be 
provided  on  government  deposits,  with  the 
balance  secured  by  a  pledge  of  government 
securities with the FDIC. 
A final category of  proposals  involves stan- 
dardizing pledging  requirements by  extending 
the  role  of  the  FDIC.  These  proposals  vary 
from advocating 100  per cent  FDIC insurance 
for  all  government  funds  to  advocating  the 
present insurance  coverage plus the pledge  of 
acceptable collateral equal to 100  per  cent  of 
the uninsured balances secured with the FDIC. 
THE IMPACT OF 
PLEDGING REQUIREMENTS 
Effect on Security Holdings 
Changes in deposits of any type will normally 
cause banks to alter their Government security 
10 This  argument  is  similar  to  one  concerning  reserve 
requirements and  bank  solvency.  In  this  connection  it  is 
widely  recognized  that  if  the  existence  of  the  reserve 
requirement  results  in  a  level  of  excess  reserves smaller 
than what the level of  reserves would  be in the absence of 
the requirement, bank liquidity has been reduced. 
11 In  Appendix  A of "The  Pledging  of  Bank  Assets:  A 
Study  of  the  Problem  of  Security  for  Public  Deposits" 
(Chicago:  Association  of  Reserve  City  Bankers,  19671, 
Charles  F.  Haywood  reports  the  results  of  a  survey  of 
pledged assets  at insured commercial  banks in  mid-1966. 
The  survey  revealed  substantial  immobilization  of  the 
security portfolio.  It was found  that 50  per cent  of  direct 
U.S Government and almost 40 per cent of  state and local 
governments were set aside. 
12 Adopted  in  Mississippi  in  addition  to  pledging 
reauirements. 
13 State insurance schemes for government  monies are run 
by the Public Deposit  Protection  Commission in  Connecti- 
cut, by  the State  Treasurer's  Sinking  Fund  in  Iowa,  the 
State  Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  in  Wisconsin,  and  the 
Insurance  Fund  for  Public  Deposits  in  Indiana.  An 
alternative to state insurance  would  be  a  private  scheme 
involving  the  use  of  surety  bonds.  Its  major  drawback, 
however,  is  that  it  involves  indirect  pledging-i.e., 
acceptable collateral  has  to  be  pledged  with  the  private 
company supplying the insurance.  Since the use of  surety 
bonds in lieu of  pledging is allowable in  most  states,  and 
banks  typically  do  not  elect  this  option,  it  cannot  be 
considered a viable option. 
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requirements  influence  security  holdings,  the 
impact of changes in  government deposits will 
differ quantitatively from the impact of changes 
in  private  deposits.14 The material  below 
presents  results  of  an empirical  investigation 
into  the  effects  of  pledging  requirements  on 
holdings of Government securities by  banks. In 
particular,  the  investigation  focuses  on  the 
extent that pledging requirements cause banks 
to alter their holdings of Government securities 
in  response  to  changes  in  the  funds  that 
governments deposit with them. 
The impact  of  changes  in  government 
deposits was examined  by  applying  regression 
analysis to data on member banks in the Tenth 
Federal  Reserve  District  reported on  call 
reports  for  1977.  The  regression  analysis  was 
used  to  measure  the  impact  on  holdings  of 
Government securities of various factors--such 
as changes in government deposits and changes 
in other deposits at banks.  From the analysis, 
estimates  were  derived  of  the  extent  that 
holdings of  Government securities  change due 
to changes in particular types of deposits. 
The  results  of  the  regression  analysis  are 
presented in  Table 2.16 They show the impact 
l4  It should  be borne in  mind that other factors,  such  as 
different  rates  of  turnover  or  interest  rate  payments 
between government  and  nongovernment  deposits,  could 
also cause a difference in impact. 
15  In order to obtain a single call report number for assets 
and liabilities for 1977, a weight of one-eighth was given to 
the December 1976 call, weights of  one-quarter each to the 
March, June, and September 1977 calls,  and a  weight of 
one-eighth  to  the  December  1977  call.  It  should  be 
emphasized  that  the empirical  results  are based on  data 
drawn from member  banks of  the Tenth  Federal Reserve 
District. Although results for other banks during the same 
period are unlikely to be different, it is possible that results 
for other time  periods  may  yield different  conclusions.  In 
particular, a major weakness of  any cross section  study  is 
the absence of factors, such as interest  rates,  that change 
over  time.  A  more  elaborate  study  combining  time  and 
cross  section  data  would  allow  an  evaluation  of  these 
qualifications. 
on  bank  holdings  of  governments  of  a  $1 
increase in various types of deposits,  under the 
assumption  that all  other  deposits  and  total 
resources  do not  change.  For  example,  a  $1 
increase in total deposits leads to an increase of 
S.382 in  holdings  of  U.S. Government securi- 
ties and a decline of S.222 in  holdings of state 
and  local  securities.  These  results  can  be 
explained  in  terms  of  general  liquidity 
considerations. As deposits increase relative to 
bank  capital,  the  bank  compensates  on  the 
asset side by  moving into items that are readily 
marketable, such as  U.S. Government  securi- 
ties, and out of  items such  as state and  local 
securities. 
The results of the regression analysis indicate 
that  pledging  requirements  do  affect  bank 
holdings  of  state  and  local  government 
securities. As shown in Table 2, banks increase 
their  holdings  of  state  and  local  government 
l6  The regression equations  underlying  the results  in  the 
table are: 
U S Sec  /TA =  -  301 +  382DiTA +  475TlTA +  473SrTA +  369(1TTA) 
( 3  52)  13  431  (5 10)  I4  881  18.091 
+  OSIGDITA +  034GTSlTA +State Dummy Var~ables 
I  291  1.431  R2 =  200. F = 15 12. N = 740, 
SPS  Sec iTA  =  276 - 222DlTA - 187TTTA - 030SlTA - 220(lITAI 
1504Il-3  111  1-3  131  (-481  1-7  541 
+  462GDlTA +  003GTSKA +State Dumt~iy  Var~abler 
I4 121  I  06)  R'  =  168, F = 12 24, N = 740, 
Total LoanslTA =  663 - 184DlTA - 071TKA - 102SnA - 132(1/TA1 
(6  881(-1  471  I- 671  (-  931  1-2 581 
- 410GDlTA - 055GTSlTA +State Dummy Var~ables 
(-2 08)  R* =  179. F = 13 21. N = 740. 
Cash DueTTA =  132 +  152DlTA - 123TlTA - 079SlTA - 04011KA) 
14  901  (4321  (-4  201  (-2571  (-2  771 
- 151GDlTA +  055GTSKA + State Dummy Var~ables 
(-2  731  12  171  R2 =  377, F  = 36 61. N = 740. 
where U.S.  Sec. = U.S.  Government securities, SPS  Sec. 
= state and  political  subdivision  securities, TA = total 
assets,  D  =  total  demand  deposits,  T  =  total  time 
deposits,  S = total  savings deposits,  GD = government 
demand  deposits,  GTS  = government  time  and  savings 
deposits. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Table 2 
REGRESSION RESULTS: IMPACT ON HOLDINGS OF GOVERNMENT 
SECURITIES OF A $1 INCREASE IN DEPOSITS 
U.S. Government  State and Local 
Deposits  Secur~ties  Securities  -  Loans  -  Cash 
Total Demand  .382  -.222  -.184*  .1 52 
Total Time  .475  -.I  87 
Total Savings  .473  -.030* 
Government Demand  .051*  .462  -.4 10  -.I51 
Government Time and Savings  .034*  .003* 
'Statistically  insignificant  variables. All others are statistically  significant at the .005 level of confidence. 
securities by S.462 in response to a $1 increase 
in government demand deposits. This is the net 
effect  of  the  pledging  requirement,  since  if 
government  demand  deposits  increase  by  $1 
and total demand  deposits remain  fixed,  non- 
government demand deposits decline by $1.  In 
the  absence  of  pledging  requirements,  the 
effect of this change in  the private-government 
composition of deposits would be zero. Table 2 
also  shows  that  changes  in  government  time 
and  savings  deposits  have  no  impact  on 
holdings  of  state  and  local  securities.  The 
regression analysis indicates that the impact of 
a  $1  change  in  the  private-government 
composition of time and savings deposits leads 
to an increase  in  holdings of  state and  local 
securities of  only S.003, an amount that is  too 
small to be statistically significant." 
The  analysis  also  indicates  that  pledging 
requirements  do not  affect  holdings  of  U.S. 
Government securities by banks. The estimated 
17 However,  if  the  security  portfolio  is  broken  down  by 
remaining maturity classes, the existence of the pledge  on 
government time and savings deposits  will cause banks to 
hold a significant, but  small, extra  amount  of  short-term 
state  and  local  securities.  These  results  are  not  reported 
here. 
changes in holdings  of  U.S. Government 
securities  resulting  from  a  $1  change  in  the 
ownership of  both  demand deposits  and  time 
and  savings  deposits  are  too  small  to  be 
statistically  significant.  However,  changes  in 
total deposits do result in changes in  holdings 
of  U.S. Government  securities.  For  example, 
an increase of $1 in demand, time, and savings 
deposits  results  in  increases  in  U.S. security 
holdings  of  S.382,  $.475,  and  $.473, 
respectively.  Thus,  the  results  suggest  that 
banks  use  as  a  pledge  against  government 
deposits the U.S. Government  securities  they 
would  have  held  anyway  in  the  absence  of 
pledging requirements. 
Effect on Other Assets 
The above  results  indicate  that  because  of 
pledging requirements, the security portfolio of 
banks is $.462 larger for every dollar of govern- 
ment demand deposits than it would be with no 
pledging  requirements.  For  a  given  level  of 
total bank resources, this means that holdings 
of  other  assets-such  as cash  and  loans-are 
lower.  Regression  analysis,  similar  to  the 
above, was conducted to examine the impact on 
cash  and  total  loans.  As  shown  in  Table  2, 
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$.410 in loans and $.I51 in cash for each dollar 
in  government  demand  deposits.  That  is,  if 
total  demand  deposits  remain  fixed,  and  a 
change  in  the  ownership  of  demand  deposits 
occurs so that government deposits increase by 
$1 and nongovernment demand deposits fall by 
$1, loans would fall $.410 and bank cash would 
fa11 $.151. 
Effect on Liquidity 
Pledging  requirements  also  may  have  an 
effect  on  bank  liquidity.  The  extent  of  the 
effect, though, depends upon the definition of 
liquidity  and  the  effectiveness  of  pledging 
requirements.  The  broadest  definition  of 
liquidity, which is employed here, is the sum of 
cash  plus  the  security  portfolio  in  excess  of 
required  reserves and  pledged  securities.  The 
effect of  the pledging requirement is  assumed 
to be  the differential  impact  on  assets  of  a 
change in government  deposits compared  to a 
change in nongovernment deposits. 
As  summarized  in  Table  2,  a  shift  in  the 
ownership  of  $1  of  demand deposits from  the 
private to the government sector results in  an 
increase in  state  and  local  securities of  S.462 
and a reduction in cash of  $.151. That is,  the 
sum of cash and the security  portfolio rises by 
$.311  ($.462 minus  $.151) as a  result  of  the 
shift.  However,  the  effect  on  liquidity  is  not 
simply  $.311-it  will  be  $.311  minus  any 
change  in  required  reserves  and  pledged 
securities.  Since  government  and  nongovern- 
ment deposits are subject  to the same reserve 
requirements,  there  is  no  effect  on  required 
reserves  resulting  from  a  change  in  the 
ownership of deposits. The situation is obvious- 
ly  different,  however,  for  the  amount  of 
securities that must be pledged.  For  states in 
the Tenth  District,  as shown  in  Table 1, the 
smallest  pledging  ratio  on  state  and  local 
deposits is 50 per cent, and for five of the states 
at least 100 per cent. This observation, coupled 
with the 100 per cent pledging ratio on Federal 
Government deposits, implies that an increase 
in  government  demand deposits  of  $1  and  a 
reduction  in  nongovernment  demand deposits 
of  $1  results in  an increase in  the amount of 
securities  that needs to be pledged  of  at least 
$.SO. These results imply that bank liquidity is 
reduced as a result of pledging.18 
Effect on Profitability of 
Government Deposits 
The existence of  pledging requirements also 
may be expected to reduce profits because they 
are a  restriction on  the operating activities  of 
banks.  To  examine  this  issue,  an  empirical 
investigation  was  made  of  the  relative 
profitability of government and nongovernment 
deposits.  Three  alternative  measures  of  net 
income  were employed-net  operating income 
(that  is,  net  income  before  taxes,  securities 
gains or losses, and loan loss provision), income 
before  taxes,  and  net  income  after  taxes.I9 
These income measures were regressed in turn 
on  asset  and  liability  items  drawn  from 
consolidated  reports  of  condition  for  member 
If the definition of liquidity is restricted to cash due plus 
securities  with  a  maturity  of  less  than  five  years  less 
required reserves and pledged securities, the negative effect 
on  liquidity  of  the  pledging  requirement  is  even  larger. 
According to results not reported in the text, a shift of $1 in 
the ownership of  demand  deposits from the private to the 
government sector  results  in an increase  of  about  S.20 in 
cash  due and  securities  with a  maturity  of  less than five 
years. This value is far below the increase  in the value of 
the securities that needs to be pledged.  -  - 
Net income before taxes, securities gains or losses, and 
loan loss provision is essentially the value of  services sold, 
minus operating costs exclusive of loan loss provision. From 
the Consolidated Report of Income form for 1977 it  would 
be  given  by "income before taxes and securities  gains or 
losses"  plus  "provision  for  possible  loan  losses."  Net 
income  before  taxes  is  calculated  from  the  1977 
Consolidated Report of Income by  adding "securities gains 
(losses), gross" to "income before taxes and securities gains 
or losses." 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City banks of the Tenth Federal Reserve District for, 
1977.1° 
The  results  indicate  that  pledging 
requirements raise the cost of government time 
and savings deposits  by  S.012  in  terms of  net 
operating income, S.030 in terms of  net income 
before taxes, and S.020 in terms of  net income 
after taxes. The effect of pledging on the cost of 
each dollar of government demand deposits is 
government deposits are growing faster; if  the 
ratio falls, private deposits are growing faster. 
In Chart  1, the  behavior  of  government 
deposits  relative  to total  deposits  is  recorded 
separately for member  and  nonmember banks 
of the Tenth District from 1969 to 1977. As the 
chart shows, there have been substantial shifts 
in  the relative  rates of  growth  of  government 
and private deposits. l2 
$.013,  S.017,  and  $.015  in  terms  of  net 
operating income, net income before taxes, and  CONCLUSION 
- 
net  income  after  taxes,  respectively.  These  A  major  conclusion  of  this  study  is  that 
results  are consistent  with  the view  that  , demand by banks for state and local securities 
government  deposits  are  less  profitable  than  is greater as a result of the presence of pledging 
private deposits. "  requirements.  However,  this  strengthening  in 
The Variability of Government Deposits 
Given  a  stable  and  predictable  relationship 
between government deposits and various asset 
items, pledging requirements will only result in 
shifts  in  the  asset  portfolio  if  government 
deposits grow at a different  rate than nongov- 
ernment deposits. The extent of any difference 
in  the  growth  rates  of  government  and 
nongovernment  deposits  can  be  examined  by 
considering the fraction of total deposits owned 
by the government sector. If the fraction  rises, 
the demand side for state and  local  securities 
necessarily  implies  a  weakening  in  banks' 
demand for other asset items. The item bearing 
the principal  burden of  this displacement  was 
found  to  be  private  loans.  Therefore,  any 
argument  advocating the use  of  pledging 
requirements  on  the grounds that they  make 
government  borrowing  easier  has  to  be 
tempered  with  the  realization  that  they  also 
make  borrowing  by  the  private  sector  more 
difficult. 
Another  conclusion  is  that  pledging 
20 The  asset  items  were  taken  to  be  gross  loans,  U.S. 
securities (sum of U.S. Treasury, U.S.  agency and corpora- 
tions'  securities),  the  securities  of  state  and  political 
subdivisions,  demand  deposits at  U.S.  banks,  and  other 
noncash  assets (a residual item amounting  to total assets 
less  loans,  all  government  securities,  and  cash  due from 
banks). The liability items were taken to be total demand 
deposits, total  time deposits, total savings deposits, other 
liabilities  (total  liabilities  minus  deposits),  government 
demand  deposits,  and  government  time  and  savings 
deposits.  A scale variable (the inverse of  total assets) and 
state dummy variables were also included. 
z1 Strictly speaking, this conbusion only follows with any 
degree  of  confidence  with  regard  to  time  and  savings 
deposits. The effect of the pledging requirement on the cost 
of  government  demand  deposits  is  not  statistically 
significant. 
22 In late 1978, moreover, there was a substantial shift in 
the ownership of  liabilities  at commercial  banks due to a 
change  in  Treasury  and  Federal  Reserve  policy.  As  of 
November  2,  1978,  Treasury  tax  and  loan  account 
depositories  were  allowed  to  administer  their  accounts 
under  either  a  note  option  or  a  remittance  option.  See 
Footnote 1. Although the options have a differential impact 
on  reserve  requirements,  they  do not  have  a  differential 
impact on  holdings of  acceptable collateral.  Both  options 
require  that  balances  be  secured  by  the  pledge  of 
acceptable securities.  For a summary of these changes and 
an  analysis  of  their  likely  impact  on  Federal  Reserve 
management of  bank reserves, see Joan E.  Lovett, "Trea- 
sury Tax and  Loan  Accounts  and  Federal  Reserve Open 
Market Operations," Federal Reserve Bank  of  New  York, 
Quarterly Review, Summer 1978, pp. 41-46. 
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22  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City requirements  tend  to  reduce  the  liquidity  of 
banks below  levels  that would  exist  in  their 
absence. Although the demand for government 
securities was increased as a result of  pledging 
requirements, the increase was found to be less 
than the value of  securities that needed  to be 
pledged.  This result, together with the finding 
,  concerning  the  displacement  of  cash,  means 
that  pledging  requirements  reduce  bank 
liquidity, when the latter is defined as cash plus 
securities  held  in  excess  of  pledging 
requirements.  Therefore,  the adverse effect  of 
pledging requirements on bank liquidity should 
be carefully considered  by those advocating the 
pledging  of  eligible  collateral  as  a  means  of 
securing government funds. 
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